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For decades now, judicial nominees, including those for seats on the 
Supreme Court of the United States, have been asked and have answered 
questions about the correctness of Brown v. Board of Education,1 the Su-
preme Court’s landmark 1954 decision, and its “unshakable precedent”2 
holding that state laws prohibiting black schoolchildren from attending pub-
lic school with white students violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 
In recent judicial nominee confirmation hearings before the United 
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Richard Blumenthal, a 
Democrat from Connecticut, has posed the Brown question to President 
Donald J. Trump’s nominees for lower federal court judgeships.4  Unlike 
judicial nominees in previous administrations, a number of President 
Trump’s nominees for lifetime appointment to the federal bench have re-
fused to answer the Brown query.  For example, federal district court nomi-
nee Wendy Vitter responded: “I don’t mean to be coy, but I think I can get 
into a difficult, difficult area when I start commenting on Supreme Court 
decisions—which are correctly decided and which I may disagree with.”5  
Andrew Oldham, nominated for a seat on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, did not answer the question, citing “the so-called 
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 1.  (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2.  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 101 (2018). 
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; (Brown I), 347 U.S. at 495; see also Fallon, supra note 2, at 
101.  
 4.  “It’s hardly a trick question.  They can either answer it or refuse, which many have done, 
but past nominees have answered it and then declined to answer questions about other prece-
dents.”  See Zoe Tillman, Trump’s Judicial Nominees Are Finally Saying Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation Was Right After at Least One Republican Senator Complained, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 21, 
2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/trump-judicial-nominees-
brown-v-board-education (quoting Senator Richard Blumenthal).   
 5.  Dahlia Lithwick, Trump’s Nominees Won’t Say if Brown v. Board of Education Was De-
cided Correctly, SLATE (Apr. 11, 2019, 6:40 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/04/trump-judicial-nominees-brown-v-board-of-educaton-precedent-refuse-
questions.html (quoting Wendy Vitter).  
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‘Ginsburg Rule[s]’”6 as support for his reply that “even the most universal-
ly accepted Supreme Court case is outside the bounds of a federal judge to 
comment on.”7  Neomi Rao, nominated for the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit seat formerly occupied by Justice 
Brett M. Kavanaugh, said “Brown is a really important precedent of the Su-
preme Court, and one that overturned Plessy v. Ferguson,8 which you know 
was a real black mark on our history.”9  She refused to go further, however, 
stating that it was “‘not appropriate’ to comment on the ‘correctness of par-
ticular precedents.’”10 
Asked if Brown was correctly decided, Ada Brown, now a federal dis-
trict judge in Dallas, Texas, replied that “Brown [was] a landmark case” and 
that,  
because of [Brown], I went to an excellent integrated school 
[while] my father went to a very poor segregated school.  That 
being said, I think it would be violative of Canon 3A(6) for me to 
give a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down as to whether or not the Su-
preme Court correctly decided the case.11   
And the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit nominee, 
Michael H. Park, stated in his responses to senators’ questions for the rec-
ord that “Brown is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court and is binding 
precedent on all lower courts” and that he “would faithfully follow it.  Be-
yond that, it would be inappropriate to opine on whether Brown, or any oth-
er decision of the Supreme Court that I would be bound to follow, was cor-
                                                          
 6.  Oldham was referring to then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s testimony at her 1993 Su-
preme Court confirmation hearing in which she stated, “once a judge starts committing, promis-
ing, hinting, previewing, forecasting, agreeing or disagreeing with precedent at this confirmation 
table, we’re in the process then of campaign promises. . . .  Once we do that, I’m fearful for the 
independence of judiciary.”  Lori A. Ringhand & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Neil Gorsuch and the Gins-
burg Rules, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 484 (2018) (footnote omitted).  “[T]he so-called ‘Gins-
burg Rule[s]’ both shepherded in and exemplified a modern practice of nominees refusing to an-
swer questions.”  Id. at 480.  It should be noted that as a judicial nominee Ginsburg did answer the 
Brown question and endorsed Brown.  See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown 
v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 474 (2000). 
 7.  Ariane de Vogue, Senate Panel Advances Judicial Nominees Who Drew Controversy for 
Brown v. Board Answer, CNN: CNNPOLITICS (May 24, 2018, 12:52 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/24/politics/vitter-oldham-brown-v-board-senate/index.html (quot-
ing Andrew Oldham).   
 8. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
 9.  Lithwick, supra note 5 (quoting Neomi Rao). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Maria Recio, Why Trump Judicial Nominees Won’t Endorse Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (May 16, 2019, 6:32 PM), 
https://www.statesman.com/news/20190516/why-trump-judicial-nominees-wont-endorse-brown-
v-board-of-education.  Canon 3A(6) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges provides 
that “[a] judge should not make public comment[s] on the merits of a matter pending or impend-
ing in any court.”  CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3A(6) (2019).  Senator Blumen-
thal has disputed nominees’ reliance on this canon, arguing that it is “completely inapplicable” 
with respect to established decisions like Brown.  Recio, supra note 11.  
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rectly decided.”12  As support for this position, Park quoted Justice Elena 
Kagan’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing statement that “it would not 
be appropriate for me to talk about what I think about past cases, you know, 
to grade cases.”13  In fact, during her confirmation hearing, Senator Ben 
Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland, asked Justice Kagan if she believed 
that Brown was relevant today.  She responded, “I hope and I know that 
Brown v. Board of Education and the principles that [Brown] set forth are 
still relevant today[,] and they’re the principles that the Equal Protection 
Clause has set forth.”14  The foregoing refusals to answer the Brown ques-
tion did not derail the nominations, as the Senate confirmed Vitter, Oldham, 
Rao, Park, and Brown.  
What explains this refusal to say that Brown was correctly decided?  
One theory posits that “nominees d[id] not want to open the door to a dis-
cussion of what they think of other Supreme Court precedents,”15 such as 
the Court’s reproductive rights16 and campaign speech decisions.17  Keep-
ing that door “closed likely makes it easier . . . to get confirmed.”18  Senator 
John Cornyn, a Republican from Texas, suggests that expressing a view on 
the correctness of Brown presents “ethical and practical challenges” for 
nominees who would find themselves on a slippery slope.19  “You can be 
asked about a [sixty-five]-year-old decision, which we celebrate here after 
all of these years as an important landmark in our guarantee of equal justice 
under the law.  But you can also be asked about a decision of the Supreme 
Court last week.”20 
                                                          
 12.  Nomination of Michael H. Park U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Questions 
for the Record: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 10 (2019), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Park%20Responses%20to%20QFRs.pdf (state-
ment of Michael H. Park).  
 13.  Id. (citing Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 64 (2010) (state-
ment of Hon. Elena Kagan)).   
 14.  Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 185 (2010) (emphasis add-
ed), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg67622/pdf/CHRG-111shrg67622.pdf; 
see also id. at 63 (discussing Brown, Kagan stated “that if you look at the specific intent of the 
drafters of the 14th Amendment, they thought that the 14th Amendment was perfectly consistent 
with segregated schools. . . .  But in Brown, the [C]ourt said otherwise.  And . . . in large part be-
cause of what Justice Marshall did . . . we got to a place where the [C]ourt said it is inconsistent 
with the principle of equal protection of the laws . . . to have segregated schools”).  
 15.  Ramesh Ponnuru, Trump’s Nominees and Brown v. Board: Two Theories, NAT’L REV. 
(Apr. 12, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/trumps-nominees-and-brown-
v-board-two-theories. 
 16.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). 
 17.  See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 18.  Ponnuru, supra note 15.  
 19.  Recio, supra note 11 (quoting Senator John Cornyn). 
 20.  Id. 
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Other reasons have been proffered for the judicial nominees’ refusal to 
respond to the Brown question.  For writer, Dahlia Lithwick, the failure to 
respond, “has nothing to do with whether Brown is still good precedent.”21  
Rather,  
[w]hat changed is that judicial nominees are carving a path to-
ward saying that they needn’t be bound by any precedent, and al-
so that every precedent is now on the table.  When judicial nomi-
nees say, as they now regularly do, that Brown is a precedent of 
the [C]ourt, what they are really saying is that a case that was de-
cided was decided, and that it’s the law until it’s reversed.  That is 
a truism—it is a description of what is.  It is also a departure from 
a standard that existed until quite recently.22 
Sherrilyn Ifill, President and Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, has observed that:  
[t]he ugly truth is that declining to offer approval of Brown sig-
nals a willingness to question the project of democracy that 
Brown created—one in which African Americans and other mar-
ginalized groups compelled the federal courts to honor the spirit 
of equal justice embodied in the words of the 14th Amendment.23   
This is not “just deeply troubling; it’s also downright dangerous.   Once po-
sitioned near the center of the canon of Supreme Court jurisprudence, it’s 
hard not to conclude that a move is afoot to move Brown to the margins.”24  
When Senator Tim Scott, a Republican from South Carolina, ex-
pressed his frustration with the nominees’ refusals to answer the Brown 
query, the Department of Justice reportedly informed nominees that contin-
ued refusals to respond could result in opposition to their confirmations.25  
Thereafter, nominees testifying at a May 22, 2019, Judiciary Committee 
hearing answered “yes” to the Brown question, and other nominees who 
had previously refused to answer the question in their hearings communi-
cated their belief that Brown was correctly decided to the Judiciary Com-
mittee or to their home state senators.26  The don’t-open-the-door and judi-
cial canon justifications for not answering thus quickly gave way to 
affirmative responses following a Republican senator’s criticism, revealing 
that the initial refusal to answer was at least in part a tactical move designed 
to allow the nominee to avoid answering the Brown question without rais-
                                                          
 21.  Lithwick, supra note 5. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Sherrilyn Ifill, If Judicial Nominees Don’t Support Brown v. Board, They Don’t Support 




 24.  Id. 
 25.  See Tillman, supra note 4.  
 26.  See id. 
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ing concern among the Republican senators that could complicate the pro-
spects of confirmation. 
I agree with Sherrilyn Ifill’s aforementioned observation regarding the 
“ugly truth” evidenced by the nominees’ unwillingness to simply state that 
Brown was correctly decided (assuming that that is their view), a reluctance 
that decenters Brown from its place in the Supreme Court’s canon27 and ap-
pears to be part of an effort to move the decision to the margin of the 
Court’s jurisprudence.  This Article presents and considers a related issue.  
Nominees who do not answer the Brown question can insulate themselves 
from a different question, such as the one posed by Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr. in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1.28  In that case, a deeply divided Court held that race-sensitive 
student assignment plans voluntarily adopted by school boards in Seattle, 
Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.29  In the closing pages of his plurality opinion, the Chief Justice, 
joined by three other Justices, considered what he termed “the heritage of 
Brown”30 and argued that the Equal Protection Clause presumptively for-
bids the consideration of race where racial segregation is not mandated by 
the state but is instead “notionally attributable to the decisions of private in-
dividuals or institutions.”31  As that position was not adopted by a majority 
of the Parents Involved Court, the issue of Brown’s heritage has not been 
definitively resolved. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  A prefatory Part I will discuss 
Brown.  Part II will then turn to Parents Involved and the Justices’ debate 
over Brown’s heritage.  Part III will return to the nominees’ refusal to an-
swer the was-Brown-correctly-decided question and will acknowledge that 
a nominee who declines to do so will undoubtedly not respond to heritage-
of-Brown inquiries that could shed informative light on the nominees’ 
views on and interpretive approaches to the resolution of cases alleging that 
certain race-sensitive governmental actions violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Yet, unanswered questions on these important subjects can still 
have value for those deciding whether to support or oppose a nominee’s 
confirmation. 
I. THE SEMINAL BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION RULING 
This Part provides a brief overview of the Court’s seminal 1954 Brown 
decision (Brown I) wherein the Court addressed and answered in the af-
                                                          
 27.  See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011) (stating Brown “is 
the classic example” of a canonical “set of decisions whose correctness participants in constitu-
tional argument must always assume”); see also Ifill, supra note, 23. 
 28.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 29.  Id. at 711, 746–47 (plurality opinion).  
 30.  Id. at 747.  
 31.  Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 30, 51 (2018). 
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firmative whether the separate-but-equal doctrine as applied to elementary 
and secondary schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.32  This Part al-
so discusses Brown II,33 the Court’s subsequent decision remanding the 
Segregation Cases to the lower courts for consideration of appropriate rem-
edies for the unconstitutional discrimination identified in Brown I.  Addi-
tionally, this Part comments on what the Court did not say in Brown I and 
the implications thereof for the heritage of Brown issue raised fifty-three 
years later in Parents Involved.34 
A. The Court’s 1954 and 1955 Decisions 
On May 17, 1954 (for segregationists, “Black Monday”),35 the Su-
preme Court issued its unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education 
(Brown I), holding public school segregation on the basis of race as uncon-
stitutional.36  Chief Justice Earl Warren’s intentionally short opinion37 ob-
served, among other things, that in its 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson38 decision 
the Court validated the separate-but-equal doctrine as applied in the context 
of public railway accommodations.39  During the half-century between 
Plessy and Brown I, the Court decided six racial segregation in public edu-
cation cases, including Sweatt v. Painter40 in which the Court expressly re-
served deciding the state-mandated segregation issue taken up by the Brown 
I Court. 
The Segregation Cases came to the Court from Kansas, South Caroli-
na, Virginia, and Delaware.41  In Brown I, the Chief Justice noted that in the 
four cases the buildings, curricula, teacher qualifications and salaries, and 
other tangible factors in black and white schools had been equalized.  
Therefore, he focused on the “separate” component of the separate-but-
equal doctrine and segregation’s effect on public education.42  Concluding 
                                                          
 32.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 33.  349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 34.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 35.  TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY (1954).  Written by a Mississippi circuit judge, vice 
president of the Mississippi Bar Association, and later Mississippi Supreme Court Justice, Brady’s 
anti-Brown and pro-segregationist book was treated as a movement guide by White Citizens 
Councils opposed to school desegregation.  See Mary Ellen Maatman, Speaking Truth to Memory: 
Lawyers and Resistance to the End of White Supremacy, 50 HOW. L.J. 1, 31–32 (2006). 
 36.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.  
 37.  In a pre-decision memorandum to his colleagues accompanying a draft of the Brown 
opinion, Chief Justice Warren advised his colleagues that the opinion was prepared on the theory 
that it “should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, 
non-accusatory.”  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 699 (1976) (quoting Chief Justice 
Warren’s memorandum).  
 38.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 39.  Id. at 550–52.  
 40.  339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 41.  See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1. 
 42.  Id. at 492. 
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“we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment 
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written,”43 he 
focused on “public education in the light of its full development and its pre-
sent place in American life throughout the Nation.”44  Discussing public 
education circa 1954, the Chief Justice stated: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and 
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recog-
nition of the importance of education to our democratic society.  
It is required in the performance of our most basic public respon-
sibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship.  Today [education] is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing [the 
child] for later professional training, and in helping [the child] to 
adjust normally to [their] environment.  In these days, it is doubt-
ful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if 
[they are] denied the opportunity of an education.  Such an oppor-
tunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.45 
Chief Justice Warren then shifted his focus “to the question presented: 
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of 
race . . . deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational op-
portunities?”46  The Court’s answer: “To separate them from others of simi-
lar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”47 
The Chief Justice quoted the Kansas court’s finding that racial segre-
gation harmed black schoolchildren: 
                                                          
 43.  Id.  The Segregation Cases were initially argued to the Court in 1952 and were restored to 
the Court’s docket for re-argument.  Id. at 488.  The parties were asked to address five questions 
on re-argument, including the following: “What evidence is there that the Congress which submit-
ted and the State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contem-
plated or did not contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation 
in public schools?”  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953) (per curiam).  Note that on-
ly state legislatures considered the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment; no state conventions 
were assembled for that purpose.  See KLUGER, supra note 37, at 619 n.*. 
In Brown I, the Court considered the Fourteenth Amendment when it was before Congress, 
the then-extant racially segregative practices, and the views of those for and against the Amend-
ment.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.  Chief Justice Warren concluded, “although these sources cast 
some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced.  At best, they are in-
conclusive.”  Id.  For critiques of and disagreement with the Court’s not-conclusive determination, 
see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 62 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive His-
tory of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991).  
 44.  Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492–93. 
 45.  Id. at 493. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 494. 
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Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children.  The impact is great-
er when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating 
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the 
negro group.  A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a 
child to learn.  Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, 
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental develop-
ment of negro children and to deprive them of some of the bene-
fits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.48  
“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at 
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, [the Court’s] finding is amply supported by 
modern authority” cited in footnote eleven of the Court’s opinion.49  Reject-
ing but not overruling Plessy,50 the Court declared, “in the field of public 
education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.  Separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal.”51  As the Court now found school 
segregation unconstitutional it set the cases for reargument on the issue of 
the remediation of the equal protection violation.52 
The following year, the Court issued another unanimous decision 
(Brown II) and directed the lower courts “to take such proceedings and en-
ter such orders . . . as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on 
a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to 
these cases.”53  As Thurgood Marshall predicted, “all deliberate speed” 
                                                          
 48.  Id. (alterations in original). 
 49.  Id. at 494 n.11.  One study cited in footnote 11, Dr. Kenneth Clark’s Effect of Prejudice 
and Discrimination on Personality Development, reported the results of a doll test in which 253 
northern and southern black children were given black dolls with brown skin and black hair, and 
white dolls with white skin and blonde hair.  Id.; see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Reconceptualizing 
the Harms of Discrimination: How Brown v. Board of Education Helped to Further White Su-
premacy, 105 VA. L. REV. 343, 351 (2019).  When asked to pick the “nice doll” and the doll that 
“is a nice color,” a majority of the children preferred the white doll and rejected the black doll.  
See id. at 351–52.  
For discussion and critiques of Clark’s doll test, see ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR 
SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 13–15 (1996); Gwen Bergner, Black Chil-
dren, White Preference: Brown v. Board, the Doll Tests, and the Politics of Self-Esteem, 61 AM. 
Q. 299 (2009); Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinari-
ty, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 293–95 (2005). 
 50.  See David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065, 
1070 (2008) (“Brown did not formally overrule Plessy” but did squarely address Plessy’s central 
claim “that segregation did not necessarily denote inferiority.”). 
 51.  Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.  It should be noted that excellent black public schools existed 
during the era of state-mandated school segregation.  See ALISON STEWART, FIRST CLASS: THE 
LEGACY OF DUNBAR, AMERICA’S FIRST BLACK PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL (2013); VANESSA SIDDLE 
WALKER, THEIR HIGHEST POTENTIAL: AN AFRICAN AMERICAN SCHOOL COMMUNITY IN THE 
SEGREGATED SOUTH (2000).   
 52.  See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 53.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
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would be interpreted to mean “S-L-O-W.”54  And Brown plaintiffs’ lawyer 
(and later federal judge) Robert L. Carter observed that this remedial formu-
la “was a grave mistake” that “sacrificed individual and immediate vindica-
tion of the newly discovered right to desegregated education in favor of a 
mass solution.”55  In fact, of the children involved in the Brown litigation 
only one, Linda Brown, ever attended a desegregated school, and she did so 
in Springfield, Missouri, after her family relocated there in the late 1950s.56 
B.  What The Court Did Not Say 
A more recent Supreme Court decision considered in the next Part, 
Parents Involved, relied heavily on Chief Justice Roberts’ framing and 
characterization of Brown I’s reasoning.57  What Brown I did not say war-
rants comment.58  The absence of specifics about race and racism and the 
protective scope of the Equal Protection Clause left room for others to con-
struct their own narratives about Brown I’s reasoning and meaning. 
As previously noted, Chief Justice Warren’s Brown I opinion was de-
liberately short, non-rhetorical, unemotional, and non-accusatory.59  The 
“diffident” opinion said “remarkably little about segregation’s origins, ide-
ology, implementation, or aims.”60  A more in-depth opinion could have 
provided important information concerning the Court’s view of the history 
and specifics of white supremacy’s racist regime of which the separate-but-
supposedly-equal doctrine was a part.  Nor did the opinion “acknowledg[e] 
the actual perpetrators of Jim Crow racism: white Southerners” or explain 
the white-supremacist desire to deploy state-commanded racial segregation 
in schools and other contexts.61  “Missing from the most honored race rela-
tions decision in American constitutional law is any express reckoning with 
racism.”62   
Moreover, the Court did not discuss the ways in which posited black 
inferiority was embedded in and internalized by society, or how whites 
benefitted from entrenched structural racism, or the harms and “dehumaniz-
ing effects of racism on Whites and their damaging consequences for our 
                                                          
 54.  CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST 
HALF-CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 10 (2004).  
 55.  Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 243 
(1969). 
 56.  See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the 
Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 437 (1999). 
 57.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 58.  See WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP 
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 
2001). 
 59.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 60.  Randall L. Kennedy, Ackerman’s Brown, 123 YALE L.J. 3064, 3067 (2014). 
 61.  Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 49, at 354. 
 62.  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Randall L. Kennedy, Ackerman’s Brown, 123 YALE L.J. 
3064, 3067–68 (2014)). 
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ability to achieve an equal society.”63  While acknowledgement and discus-
sion of those subjects would have been contrary to Chief Justice Warren’s 
desire to avoid casting blame on those who formulated, enforced, and bene-
fitted from the cradle-to-grave racial segregation of black persons,64 the 
“watered down” Brown opinion65 “simply left the door open for future civil 
rights doctrine to ignore it” and “left the false impression that all that was 
needed to achieve true racial equality was formal legal access to what 
Whites had real access to.”66  That false impression has provided fertile 
ground for differing views on Brown’s meaning and heritage.67 
II. PARENTS INVOLVED AND THE BROWNS’  HERITAGE ISSUE 
More than fifty years after Brown I and II, a deeply divided Court in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
held that race-sensitive student assignment plans voluntarily adopted by 
school boards in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.68  The Court concluded that the challenged 
plans unconstitutionally sought to attain a level of student body diversity by 
approximating the overall racial demographics of the school districts, rea-
soning that the plans were not narrowly tailored to achieve the diversity-
related educational and social benefits.  This Part focuses on the plurality 
part of the Court’s opinion and the Justices’ debate over what Chief Justice 
Roberts termed “the heritage of Brown.”69 
A.  The Plurality Opinion Rewrites Key Aspects of Brown 
In the plurality part of the Parents Involved decision, Chief Justice 
Roberts noted what he called a debate between the parties and amici over 
                                                          
 63.  Id. at 355; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 
69 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1960) (“I can heartily concur in the judgment that segregation harms the 
white as much as it does the Negro.  Sadism rots the policeman; the suppressor of thought loses 
light; the community that forms into a mob, and goes down and dominates a trial, may wound it-
self beyond healing.  Can this reciprocity of hurt, this fated mutuality that inheres in all inflicted 
wrong, serve to validate the wrong itself?” (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959))). 
 64.  See Paul Finkelman, Breaking the Back of Segregation: Why Sweatt Matters, 36 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 7, 8–9, 14 (2010) (explaining that segregation extended beyond public 
schools and included segregated funeral parlors, cemeteries, jails and prisons, textbooks, libraries, 
churches, Bibles used in courtrooms, and state schools for the blind). 
 65.  NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN 
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 28 (2019). 
 66.  Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 49, at 362. 
 67.   See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text. 
 68.  The Court concluded that the at-issue plans were not narrowly tailored to the achieve-
ment of the assertedly compelling governmental interest in student body diversity.  551 U.S. 701, 
726 (2007). 
 69.  Id. at 747 (plurality opinion). 
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which side was more faithful to the heritage of Brown.70  While not perti-
nent to the Court’s invalidation of the student diversity issue, the plurality 
opinion took sides in that debate and set forth an understanding of Brown 
that differed from their colleagues’ reading of the Court’s opinion. 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito Jr., invoked the Brown plaintiffs to support 
their understanding of the Court’s 1954 decision.71  The plaintiffs’ position 
“was spelled out in their brief and could not have been clearer: ‘[T]he Four-
teenth Amendment prevents states from according differential treatment to 
American children on the basis of their color or race.’”72  “What do the ra-
cial classifications at issue here do,” the Chief Justice asked, “if not accord 
differential treatment on the basis of race?”73  Having sided with (his char-
acterization of) the plaintiffs’ position, Chief Justice Roberts quoted the fol-
lowing sentence from Brown lawyer Robert L. Carter’s 1952 oral argument 
to the Court: “‘We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to 
develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no State 
has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities 
among its citizens.’”74  Chief Justice Roberts found “no ambiguity in that 
statement,” and argued that the position prevailing in Brown I was subject 
to Brown II’s call for the admission of the plaintiffs “as soon as practicable 
on a nondiscriminatory basis’”75  Again, Chief Justice Roberts asked, 
“What do the racial classifications do in [the Seattle and Louisville] cases, 
if not determine admission to a public school on a racial basis?”76 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy denied the Chief Justice a fifth and ma-
jority-creating vote on the no-racial-classifications point, stating, “The en-
during hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it 
does.”77  For Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts’ position suggested 
“an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances 
when, in my view, it may be taken into account.”78  Justice Kennedy further 
noted that Chief Justice Robert’s opinion was “too dismissive of the legiti-
mate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity 
regardless of their race.”79 
                                                          
 70.  See id.  
 71.  Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 72.  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747 (quoting Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for 
Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument in Brown I, O.T. 1953, p. 15 (Summary of Argument)). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Brown v. Bd. of Educ.(Brown I), 347 U.S. 
483 (1954)). 
 75.  Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 787–88. 
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As for the Chief Justice’s reliance on Brown II’s “nondiscriminatory 
basis” and “nonracial basis” language, those references do not define and 
delimit the substantive constitutional violation found in Brown I.80  Reme-
diation of the anti-black segregative practices inflicted on black schoolchil-
dren (the unequal protection found in Brown I) commonsensically requires 
the elimination of that racial discrimination, i.e. requires admissions on a 
nondiscriminatory and nonracial basis.  Thus, Brown II’s remediation lan-
guage should not be confused or merged with the substantive constitutional 
violation found in Brown I. 
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts’s argument that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause unambiguously prohibits any and all racial classifications is a 
plausible one if, and only if, his account of the Brown plaintiffs’ brief and 
Carter’s oral argument is accurate.  However, that is not the conventional or 
standard account of Brown I.  The posited absence of ambiguity in Carter’s 
1952 argument vanishes, however, when the totality of Carter’s argument is 
considered.  Carter did not focus on racial classification simpliciter; rather, 
he was fully aware of and specifically noted the ways in which state-
mandated public school segregation made it “impossible for Negro children 
to secure equal educational opportunities within the meaning of the equal 
protection of the laws.”81  The racial classification of African-American 
schoolchildren was thus the discriminatory means to a racially subordinat-
ing and segregative end.  Speaking in 2007, after the Court issued the Par-
ents Involved decision, Judge Carter rejected Chief Justice Roberts’ charac-
terization of Carter’s Brown arguments.  “All that race was used for at that 
point in time was to deny equal opportunity to black people. . . .  It’s to 
stand that argument on its head to use race the way they use [it] now.”82 
It is also noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberts did not refer to Brown 
lawyer Thurgood Marshall’s 1953 argument to the Brown Court.83  Mar-
shall argued that separate-but-equal laws could not be distinguished from 
                                                          
 80.  See id. at 747 (plurality opinion); see supra Part I.B. 
 81.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 
(1955), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).  
 82.  Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/us/29assess.html; see also id. (elucidating Brown lawyer 
William T. Coleman, Jr.’s view that Parents Involved “is 100 percent wrong” and is “dirty pool”). 
 83.  Mark Tushnet, Parents Involved and the Struggle for Historical Memory, 91 IND. L.J. 
493, 501 (2016).  Professor Mark Tushnet has observed that, in quoting Carter and not Marshall, 
Chief Justice Roberts was aware that the four members of the Parents Involved Court who had 
served with Justice Marshall 
knew—insofar as anyone could know—what Marshall would have thought about the 
constitutionality of Seattle’s program had he been presented with it before he left the 
Court. . . .  Claiming Marshall’s authority for the result in Parents Involved . . .would 
have been an insult to Marshall’s memory in a way that using Carter’s words was not 
quite insulting to Marshall.  For that reason, it would have weakened the Chief Justice’s 
opinion.   
Id. 
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the post-emancipation Black Codes,84 and that “the only way” for the Court 
to rule against the plaintiffs “[was] to find that for some reason Negroes 
[were] inferior to all other human beings.”85  Marshall made clear that the 
Brown plaintiffs sought relief from the historical and ongoing subordination 
of African Americans and the “inherent determination that the people who 
were formerly in slavery, regardless of anything else, shall be kept as near 
that stage as is possible; and now is the time, we submit, that this Court 
should make it clear that that is not what our Constitution stands for.”86  
Marshall’s contextual and historical argument clearly identifies and chal-
lenges racial subordination and is not some abstract, acontextual, and ahis-
torical understanding of equal protection that is disconnected and hermeti-
cally sealed from anti-black discrimination and the opportunity-denying 
effects thereof. 
B.  The Plurality’s Abstractional, Acontextual, and Ahistorical 
Approach 
Chief Justice Roberts’ abstractional, acontextual, and ahistorical ap-
proach is also on display in his description of the public-school segregation 
addressed in Brown.  Recall Chief Justice Warren’s statement of the ques-
tion presented in Brown I: “Does segregation of children in public schools 
solely on the basis of race . . . deprive the children of the minority group of 
equal educational opportunities?”87  Now consider Chief Justice Roberts’ 
decolorized account of pre-Brown segregation: “Before Brown, schoolchil-
dren were told where they could and could not go to school based on the 
color of their skin.”88  Responding to and noting the “cruel irony” in the 
Chief Justice’s description, Justice John Paul Stevens correctly pointed out 
that before Brown, “it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; 
indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to 
attend black schools. . . .   In this and other ways, the Chief Justice rewrites 
the history of one of this Court’s most important decisions.”89 
                                                          
 84.  See Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and 
Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 935–41 (2019) (discussing the Black Codes).  
The Black Codes were enacted in the former states of the Confederacy and restricted freedper-
sons’ rights to enter into contracts, own property, travel, and gain access to courts.  See Timbs v. 
Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682, 688 (2019) (discussing the history of the Black Codes); NICHOLAS 
LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 34 (2006). 
 85.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, supra note 81, at 522–23. 
 86.  Id. at 523. 
 87.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added); see supra 
notes 44–52, and accompanying text. 
 88.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747 (2007) 
(plurality opinion). 
 89.  Id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 803 (“It is my 
firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s 
decision.”). 
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In the penultimate paragraph of his plurality opinion, Chief Justice 
Roberts declared, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race.”90  This rhetorical tautology91 sup-
poses that all considerations of race, no matter the context or history, are 
constitutionally impermissible.92  But “discrimination” is not always wrong 
or unlawful; it “is important and even necessary in some instances” and in-
volves distinctions routinely drawn “among people in public policy and law 
as well as in business, school settings, and private life.”93  Whether certain 
conduct is or is not constitutional involves normative judgments about 
equal protection and “an independent account of what equal protection 
means and the values underlying such a judgment.”94  Who is being treated 
differently, the reasons for and the forms of that differential treatment, and 
other pertinent facts and details must be considered before a conclusion of 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality can be reached. 
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts’ “stop discrimination” postulate95 
problematically conceptualizes “race” as a skin color and “as a superficial 
individual trait, disconnected from vertical understandings of group hierar-
chy.”96  On that understanding, any governmental consideration of “race” is 
contrary to an imagined colorblind Constitution;97 that approach is indiffer-
ent to history and context and the actual lived experiences of those subject-
ed to anti-black and other discrimination.  Reflexively concluding that all 
considerations of race are forbidden without regard to “complex social 
facts” or additional “information about the evaluated action beyond the 
                                                          
 90.  Id. at 748 (plurality opinion); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting) (“The way to end 
racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by race.”), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007).  
 91.  See Richard R. W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality, 124 YALE L.J. 2626, 2661 
(2015). 
 92.  But see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 833–35 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection 
Clause” and that the context of the Seattle and Louisville cases “is not one in which race-
conscious limits stigmatize or exclude,” “pit the races against each other or otherwise significantly 
exacerbate racial tensions,” or “impose burdens unfairly upon members of one race alone”). 
 93.  DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 2–3, 172 (2008); see also id. 
at 2 (explaining that the word discrimination has negative connotations and positive associations 
as well, and “it is sometimes permissible and sometimes impermissible to draw such distinctions 
among people”).  
 94.  Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Think-
ing About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1183 (2019). 
 95.  See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (“The plurality’s postulate . . . is not sufficient to decide these cases.  Fifty years of 
experience since Brown v. Board of Education . . . should teach us that the problem before us de-
fies so easy a solution.”). 
 96.  OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE 
BLIND 115–116 (2014). 
 97.  See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 730 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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moral valuation”98 lumps together exclusionary anti-black discrimination 
and inclusionary considerations of race in the pursuit of student body diver-
sity, thereby erroneously treating alike that which is markedly, contextually, 
and historically different.99 
By contrast, “race” as a lived experience and as a racialized marker has 
historically been used to create and maintain both a racial and racist hierar-
chy.  Race has a social meaning that is not captured by Chief Justice Rob-
erts’ approach.  Knowledge and comprehension of a particular social mean-
ing, such as racial segregation’s “putting of the Negro in a position of 
walled-off inferiority,”100 is crucial to the application of “a normative theo-
ry for why (and when)” consideration of race is “worthy of moral con-
cern.”101  Do not discriminate tautologies are no substitute for contextual 
and nuanced analysis. 
A pointed response to Chief Justice Roberts’ “stop discriminating on 
the basis of race” approach was issued by Justice Sonia Sotomayor in her 
dissent from the Court’s 2014 decision in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action.102  The genesis of her Schuette dissent began the previ-
ous year when the Court considered Abigail Fisher’s equal protection chal-
lenge to the University of Texas at Austin’s race-conscious undergraduate 
admissions program.103  It has been reported that after the oral argument in 
that case the Justices initially voted five to three to invalidate the universi-
ty’s program and Chief Justice Roberts assigned the majority opinion to 
Justice Kennedy.104  Justice Ginsburg, the most senior of the dissenting Jus-
tices, assigned the drafting of the main dissent to Justice Sotomayor,105 who 
had joined the Court two years after Parents Involved.  Justice Sotomayor 
circulated a draft dissent and personal defense of affirmative action.106  Af-
ter reading the heated draft dissent, Justice Kennedy sought a compromise 
and wrote an opinion for a seven-Justice majority remanding the case to the 
                                                          
 98.  Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 94, at 1171. 
 99.  See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 865 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality’s 
“view of the law rests . . . upon a denial of the distinction between exclusionary and inclusive use 
of race-conscious criteria” and “slows down and sets back the work of local school boards to bring 
about racially diverse schools”). 
 100.  Black, supra note 63, at 427. 
 101.  Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 94, at 1214. 
 102.  572 U.S. 291, 300, 312–14 (2014) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to an amend-
ment to the Michigan Constitution prohibiting affirmative action in public education, employment, 
and contracting). 
 103.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 302 (2013). 
 104.   See JOAN BISKUPIC, BREAKING IN: THE RISE OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR AND THE POLITICS 
OF JUSTICE 200–01 (2014). 
 105.  See id. at 205. 
 106.  See id. at 206. 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.107  Justice Sotomayor 
joined the majority opinion and withdrew her dissent.108 
Justice Sotomayor reviewed the draft sections of her Fisher dissent as 
she wrote her Schuette opinion.109  Her published dissent responded to the 
Chief Justice’s Parents Involved’s “stop discriminating” statement.110  In 
her view, that approach expressed “a sentiment out of touch with reality, . . . 
one that has properly been rejected as ‘not sufficient’ to resolve cases of 
this nature.”111  Cataloguing ways in which “race matters,”112 Justice So-
tomayor observed that “race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the 
silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: ‘I do not be-
long here.’”113  She wrote: 
The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak 
openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Con-
stitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of 
racial discrimination.  As members of the judiciary tasked with 
intervening to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we 
ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial 
inequality that exists in our society.  It is this view that works 
                                                          
 107.  See id. at 205–09.  On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that the university’s admissions 
program passed constitutional muster and the case returned to the Supreme Court.  Fisher v. Univ. 
of Tex. Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016).  In 2016, the Court held that the program withstood 
strict scrutiny review.  See id. at 2214.  
 108.  See JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE 
JOHN ROBERTS 267 (2019). 
 109.  See id. at 280. 
 110. 572 U.S. at 380 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion)). 
 111.  Id. (citing Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment)). 
 112.  Id. at 380–81. Justice Sotomayor’s discussion of this point warrants quotation: 
  Race matters.  Race matters in part because of the long history of racial minorities’ 
being denied access to the political process. . . . 
  Race also matters because of persistent racial inequality in society—inequality that 
cannot be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic disparities. . . . 
  And race matters for reasons that really are only skin deep, that cannot be discussed 
any other way, and that cannot be wished away.  Race matters to a young man’s view 
of society when he spends his teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no 
matter the neighborhood where he grew up.  Race matters to a young woman’s sense of 
self when she states her hometown, and then is pressed, “No, where are you really 
from?,” regardless of how many generations her family has been in the country.  Race 
matters to a young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign language, which he does 
not understand because only English was spoken at home.  Race matters because of the 
slights, the snickers, the silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: 
“I do not belong here.” 
Id. 
 113.  Id. at 381. 
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harm, by perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race mat-
ter is acknowledging the simple truth that race does matter.114 
Thus, and unlike Chief Justice Roberts’ focus on “race,” Justice Sotomayor 
went beyond “the epidermal lottery into which we are all cast”115 and fo-
cused on racism and “what race has done and been asked to do throughout 
history.”116 
Chief Justice Roberts responded to Justice Sotomayor’s reproach in his 
two-paragraph Schuette concurrence joined by no other Justice.117  “[I]t is 
not ‘out of touch with reality’ to conclude that racial preferences may them-
selves have the debilitating effect of reinforcing precisely that doubt [about 
belonging], and—if so—that the preferences do more harm than good.”118  
In his view, disagreement regarding the costs and benefits of what he called 
racial preferences (and what Justice Sotomayor has termed “race-sensitive” 
policies)119 “is not to ‘wish away, rather than confront,’ racial inequali-
ty. . . .  People can disagree in good faith on this issue, but it similarly does 
more harm than good to question the openness and candor of those on either 
side of the debate.”120  In her recently published biography of Chief Justice 
Roberts, legal analyst Joan Biskupic observes that his reply to Justice So-
tomayor “remains one of the most revealing of his tenure so far.  It reflects 
the passion with which he approaches questions of race as well as his dis-
dain for anything from a [J]ustice that could be interpreted as a personal or 
policy judgment.”121 
The significance of Chief Justice Roberts’ view that Brown stands for 
the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause forbids any and all gov-
ernmental consideration of race lies in the implications of that view for fu-
ture cases challenging programs and policies in which race is considered as 
a factor in decisionmaking, for example, in college and university admis-
sions.   
Accepting the premise that Brown should be understood as a decision 
prohibiting racial classifications simpliciter could render constitutionally 
problematic race-sensitive affirmative action plans and provide a jurispru-
                                                          
 114.  Id. (first emphasis added).  
 115.  Jelani Cobb, Donald Trump’s Idea of Selective Citizenship, NEW YORKER (July 21, 
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/29/donald-trumps-idea-of-selective-
citizenship.  
 116.  Khiara M. Bridges, The Dangerous Law of Biological Race, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 37 
(2013); see also Ronald Turner, “The Way to Stop Discrimination on the Basis of Race . . . ”, 11 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 84–87 (2015) (comparing and contrasting Chief Justice Roberts’ race-
based and Justice Sotomayor’s racism-based approaches).   
 117.  Schuette, 572 U.S. at 315 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 352 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also BISKUPIC, supra note 104, at 208 (2014) 
(discussing Justice Sotomayor’s preference for “phrases such as ‘race-sensitive admissions poli-
cies’ to the phrase ‘affirmative action’”). 
 120.  Schuette, 572 U.S. at 315–16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 121.  BISKUPIC, supra note 108, at 284. 
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dential basis for their invalidation.  Acceptance of a different premise, that 
Brown targeted state-mandated segregation and subjugation of black 
schoolchildren, involves not just racial classification but racial subordina-
tion.  A nominee who accepts the classification premise may, like Chief 
Justice Roberts, want to ban all considerations of race no matter the history 
or context.  Such information may be of interest and useful to an inquiring 
senator and the public whether they advocate or oppose race-sensitive af-
firmative action. 
The importance of the Brown question and answers or non-responses 
thereto remain on the table.  Did Brown determine that all governmental 
considerations and uses of race violate the Equal Protection Clause?  Under 
the aforementioned anti-classification approach,122 consideration of race is 
the constitutional injury; whether that consideration is a factor in segregat-
ing or integrating minority children does not matter.  “Thus, Linda Brown, 
who had to walk over train tracks to the inferior black school, and the white 
children in the superior school were harmed in the same way as Linda 
walked by.”123  That approach, shorn of history and context, invisibilizes 
the anti-black racism challenged in Brown. 
Or (as I believe) is Brown best or better understood as a declaration 
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits segregative and subordinating an-
ti-black discrimination targeting black schoolchildren?  This anti-
subordination approach referenced in the preceding paragraph distinguishes 
“between benign and invidious discrimination” and is concerned, as was the 
Brown Court, with “practices that disproportionately harm members of 
marginalized groups.”124  Thus, any and all claimed differential treatment, 
no matter the issue or context, is not automatically of constitutional con-
cern.  The protective and remedial focus of Brown was legally classifying 
and treating as inferior, not all schoolchildren, but black schoolchildren.   
                                                          
 122.  Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of De-
cision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1287 (2011).  This principle applies in cases 
involving non-remedial considerations of race, and not in cases in which a finding of unlawful 
intentional discrimination has been made and race is considered in remedying that violation.  See 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987); see also Greene, supra note 31, at 51 
(“[T]rial courts that find de jure racial segregation of public schools are empowered to put in place 
and enforce the most coercive remedies known to constitutional law: busing of children across 
county lines and retaining jurisdiction over local educational decisions for decades.”). 
 123.  Kimberlé Crenshaw, The Court’s Denial of Racial Societal Debt, 40 HUM. RTS. 13 
(2013). 
 124.  Siegel, supra note 122, at 1288–89; see also Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108, 157 (1976) (discussing the “group-disadvantaging 
principle” applicable to laws that “aggravate[]” or “perpetuate[] . . . the subordinate position of a 
specially disadvantaged group”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassi-
fication Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 
(2004) (explaining that “the conviction” of the antisubordination principle is “that it is wrong for 
the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed 
groups”).  
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Or (as I also believe) Brown can fairly be read and understood as both 
an anticlassification and antisubordination decision125 prohibiting the de-
ployment of racial classification as an inferiority-signaling and subordinat-
ing mechanisms for separating black and nonwhite schoolchildren from 
white students.  On the latter two views, Brown’s “heritage” does not render 
unconstitutional all governmental race-sensitive policies and programs 
without regard to relevant context and history. 
III. REFUSAL TO ANSWER THE BROWN QUESTION 
As previously discussed,126 President Trump’s judicial nominees’ re-
cent refusals to answer the question of whether Brown was correctly decid-
ed is an interesting and important phenomenon warranting our attention.  
Among the justifications offered for that refusal is the slippery slope con-
cern that expressing a view on the correctness of Brown would open the 
door to questions about other Court decisions.127  Additionally, some nomi-
nees who initially refused to answer the Brown question ultimately only an-
swered after a Republican senator expressed his frustration with their non-
responsiveness.128  
This Article has offered an additional and important reason: the possi-
bility of follow-up questions, not just about other Supreme Court decisions, 
but about the nominee’s views on Brown’s heritage and what those views 
may suggest or reveal regarding the nominee’s jurisprudential commit-
ments.  And a nominee’s favorable confirmation hearing comments about 
Brown do not mean that a potential judge would not today agree with the 
Parents Involved plurality’s no-consideration-of-race interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Supreme Court nominees Roberts, Thomas, and 
Alito129 spoke approvingly of Brown but joined the plurality opinion. 
                                                          
 125.  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Bottlenecks and Antidiscrimination Theory, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
415, 415–16 (2014) (reviewing JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY (2014)). 
 126.  See supra notes 4–14 and accompanying text.  
 127.  See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 129.  During his confirmation hearing, nominee John Roberts stated: Brown “is more con-
sistent with . . . the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment than Plessy v. Ferguson” 
and is “based on the conclusion that the separation of the races in the schools was itself a violation 
of equal protection.”  Emily Bazelon, What John Roberts Really Thinks, SLATE (Sept. 15, 2005), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/09/what-john-roberts-really-thinks.html.   
Nominee Clarence Thomas stated: Brown “changed my life and changed the South.”  Paul 
Gordon, All Current SCOTUS Justices Supported Brown v. Board at Their Nominations Hear-
ings—Why Won’t Some of Trump’s Nominees?, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY (Apr. 30, 2018), 
http://www.pfaw.org/nlog-posts/all-current-scotus-justices-supported-brown-v-board-at-their-
nominations-hearings-why-wont-some-of-trumps-nominees.   
Nominee Samuel Alito stated: Brown is “one of the greatest, if not the single greatest thing 
that the Supreme Court of the United States has ever done.”  Id. 
60 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 79:41 
Given Parents Involved’s unresolved debate about Brown’s heritage 
(and therefore future) and recent changes in the Court’s composition,130 the 
views of lower court nominees who may decide future cases addressing 
these and other race-sensitive issues, decisions that may come before the 
Court for review, are of obvious importance.  Nominees who refuse to an-
swer whether Brown was correctly decided will undoubtedly refuse to re-
spond to heritage-of-Brown and other Brown-related questions, especially 
where doing so does not derail their confirmations.  Nevertheless, posing 
queries that go unanswered can still be of value to inquiring senators and 
the public who may consider that disinclination as evidence of an effort to 
marginalize Brown and therefore a reason to oppose a nominee’s confirma-
tion.131 
                                                          
 130.  Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy participated in Parents Involved but are no longer 
on the Court.  If the Court returns to the Browns’ heritage issue, will Justice Scalia’s and Kenne-
dy’s replacements, Justices Neil M. Gorsuch and Brett M. Kavanaugh, adopt the Parents Involved 
plurality position and provide a Court majority for Chief Justice Roberts’ reading of Brown? 
During his Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Gorsuch, asked by Senator Blumenthal if 
he agreed with the result in Brown, stated that Brown “was a correct application of the law of 
precedent.”  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 115th Cong. 211 (2017) (statement of Judge Gorsuch).  Blumenthal asked Gorsuch if he 
would agree with nominee Roberts’ following response in his confirmation hearing to the observa-
tion that Brown concluded that segregating children in public schools solely on the basis of race 
was unconstitutional: “I do.”  Id.  Gorsuch’s reply: “Senator, there is no daylight here.”  Id.  As 
noted by Professor Lori Ringhand, “It is difficult to know what to make of this exchange.  It is 
unlikely that Gorsuch was expressing disagreement with Brown, but nor was he willing to simply 
affirm it as had Roberts (and every other nominee testifying before the Judiciary Committee in 
recent decades).”  Ringhand & Collins, supra note 6, at 483.   
Nominee Kavanaugh, asked by Senator Amy Klobuchar, Democrat from Minnesota, if 
Brown “is settled law,” answered, “I think Brown versus Board of Education as I’ve said many 
times before, is the single greatest moment in Supreme Court history. . . .  It’s correct because it 
corrected a historic mistake in Plessy v. Ferguson.”  Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the 
Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to be an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court, Fed. News 
Serv. Transcripts (Sept. 6, 2018), 2018 WLNR 27463623 at 17; see also Brett M. Kavanaugh, The 
Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 683, 688 (2016) (Brown is one of “the 
greatest moments in American judicial history” as “judges stood up to the other branches, were 
not cowed, and enforced the law.  That takes backbone, or what some call judicial engagement.  
To be a good judge and a good umpire, you have to possess strong backbone.”).  
 131.  See Ifill, supra note 23. 
